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no need to be unduly alarmed about our contemporary situation. While it is possible to make a very
convincing case for this argument, there are three major factors which are new today. Thanks to our past
territorial expansion and new techniques of communication, there is no area of the Western World whose
ideas and institutions have been unchanged, Today's changes are immediately carried to all parts of the world.
Thus there are no longer any isolated areas to which people can go to escape change and its consequences.
Also, thanks to the same means no classes in society are immune from these changes. Whereas in earlier
centuries such changes affected only minority groups and limited areas, now they affect all groups and all
areas. And further, as we have already noted, this combination of factors, plus the size of our institutions and
their competition with one another, have served to increase the rate of change. These three new factors have
helped to make our contemporary crisis both more widespread and penetrating than the others which
Western Civilization has experienced. [excerpt]
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It is possible to draw certain parallels between the West's 
XIX p. IS 
present, prfidicament .and similar periods^ of radical change and tha 
dislocation of values, and so to suggest that this sort of thing 
"Tias happened Tie , tfiaf ^  alwa^ ouf^o^su^TsTf-
ijj^ibns jRd^^ is basicaiiy ~^^icad, 
anff~tEat there is no need to be unduly alarmed about our contem-
porary si^ation. While„ it is £osglble.^^jQ^^e a very convincing 
case for this Argument, theygl^re 
new"~today. Thanks to our past Territori1rr"'expaSsion and new 
WcKnX^es of communication, there is no area of the_Wfis±ern 
World whose ideiS'S and institutions h^yelbeen~3|i^^ Today's 
changes iare iime^ all-parts ol the world. Thus 
there are no longer any isolated areas to v/hich people can go to 
escape change and its consequences. Also, thanks to the~same,jaeaji^  
no cla^jss .iJcu-saciety^Jire immune frQm„ th@se„.£il3angfis^ Whereas in 
elrXier centuries such changes affected only minority groups and 
limited areas, now they affect all groups and all areas. And 
further, as we have already noted, this combination of factors, 
plus the size of our institutions and their competition with one 
another, have served to increase the rate of change. These three 
new factors have helped to make our contemporary crisis both more 
widespread and penetrating than the others which Western Civili­
zation has experienced. 
There have beei^various attempts to do something about the 
pres^iaZpxedlcauaen by locatinglK. s suggesting-A^ . 
Fascism, Naziism, and Communism have all offered a single class, 
group, or race as the source of contemporary man's troubles. They 
have also offered a much overly simplified solution for this 
trouble, concentrating either on the political or economic factors, 
and paying little attention to other factors. Other attempts have 
rejected such diagnoses and solutions as these as unrealistic and 
incomplete, as in the last analysis, ignoring every man's responsi­
bility for getting into this situation as well as for getting out 
cf it. To these latter attempts the traditions of Puritanism and 
the Enlightenment have contributed their common insistence on a 
man's responsibility for his ideas and his actions, as v/ell as 
for the consequences that flow from them. 
Ano^ ojL,g.ttemjpt to^ ^^ r predicament is aaen 
ill the widespread demand for meaning today. There is a general 
dissatisfaction with the categQrlB£UjaLL_thouRht which v/e have In.-
herited,froiiL tiie past, and - a.. beliaf that, -t hesL^Are no longe r appli­
cable to the current -Situation. The emphasis on time in certain 
aspects of modern thought (such as science and philosophy) has 
undermined the static forms and universals of our Greek heritage. 
The emahasig on axperience has undermined the possibility of any 
a priori or deductive law. And some of the results of science and 
Technology, such as nuclear weapons, have disabused man of his 
earlier belief that they could solve all his problems. Further, 
anthropological studies have seriously .weakened Western 
earlier faith in the correctness and sufficiency. Q£-iiis oiam 
cultureAnd finally, recent psychological analysis has not only 
raised doubts concerning our reiigiQiialcategories^ also 
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(Tiffpvftd mythnlnffi-aai gnT-.c-n tn+cci -Fz-^-r them, The result of such 
developments as these has been an increasing need and demand for 
new and relevant categories which will not only be more adequate 
for the task which confronts man, but which will also offer him 
something more positive in which to believe. 
are, within_thg^is^.afcl^ types of. 
r e s p ^ a ^ u ^ t h a t  w i l l  b e  m R a n g n g f u ' T .  
..There is one which attempts to reach some transcendental or super-
nattip,l point pf reference^, and angEum'-which tries to v-ip^i iTT 
point of reference-v/ithixL_the confines of a nature much expanded 
by the contri taut ions of recent thought. Within this latter natur-
aJ-AStic~fraBtgwQ£.k thei-e have developed two different interpretations 
of meaning. The first nf t.hpjRP- has made a sustained attempt to 
i^each some overallgeBeralization. while^he second is nr>nt.ent~t.n 
li"^it itself to specialized areas. it is along these three lines 
that tlie contemporary search for meaning appears to be running. 
<|i^^"°sion of contemrtorarv proM-ems anri 
a^ttempted solutinncj must wp-S^- ^^pnn r-larifinatjon of the word 
'l,pLSailing.What is needed at this point is a tentative definition, 
some interpretation of the "meaning of meaning." " 
used to refer to yeiateditess. It applies to both thoughts 
ana action's. Tf^sTofTglir™!^'often in the recognition of similarities 
in our experiences, on the basis of which we can say that two of 
these pieces of stone are jade but the third is not, or that one 
of these experiments will lead to the production of electricity while 
the other will not, or that one of these possible courses of action 
is more likely to be satisfying than the others. Thrnngh thii.s com­
paringand coji^ tra^ tins expLerienc^  deve.Loj3Bjd.__siich 
patterns as the universals of Aristotle and the laws of Newton. 
There_liaj^:e__Jieen, in the past, tv/o major aspects of these 
patterns of meaning, one which fQ^S£.d,.Xbii~tJiie±rljiasis or status, 
focused i3n their range or scope. There ^ ave been 
two rnterpretatiQna. Qf theZii^i4«s of these "pattf^iaMa^ one has 
pointed to the way in which they are at out oflnaK!^ ' 
experiejHCe_^ that they t^ TIST a t i to 
• The otheOjas pointed to.„_±.ha,l.y. affj n^ny for both 
knowing and acting, and has therelore concluded that""these""pat­
terns are ,o6jic£x-va3a,a.£alua^ ,.xeferring and appl^ c^ bl 
-itself, and indep©nd©nt...of-man's-experience af .XE. ' In general the 
former interpretation has been followed by the empiricists such as 
Ilume, while the latter has been followed by the supernaturalists 
and rationalists such as Augustine and Hegel. 
There have also been two interpretations of the range of 
these patterns. Que.Jias insisted that meaning .can.j5eVgT--be^correct 
xinles.s it is complete; while the other has argued thatl as complete 
^ patterns c be'meaningful only 
EeXd within khowable and manageable "Tilirfs'".""'^  se who 
insist on the completeness oi meaning, the generalists as they are 
sometimes called, point to the fact that our world is becoming more 
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of a single unit than ever before and that, therefore, we are_ 
desperate need of a meaning whlGh. Is whO-le„„ajid.-CDmplete. And, 
since the world is one, they argue, any partial pattern is, by 
definition, incomplete and therefore incorrect. Those whn ing^iFft 
on^the limited or restricted interpretation of the range of mean-
in^_^ the speimes called, point to the 
fact that the twentieth centurv world i« an hupj-ft and complicated 
that we cannot know it all, and that we_-wrmlri therpfnrfi dn better 
to restrij^ ourselves to manageable areas. In this way, they 
argire";—scfT^east what we do know will have solid grounding. 
These two aspects of meaning; have been complicated by the 
COntributions, of. rec©nt - studlis in such areas as physical.scxengp 
and cultural anthyopology-^ These studies have emphasized the ideas 
of change, process, evolution, and history, all of which under­
score the aspect of temporality and the fact of man's involvement 
in change. The impact of this body of ideas has been to weaken 
seriously the interpretation of meaningful patterns as static or 
mechanical. fani- -M-ia-f; man is seen as an integral-parA-of 
bnt.h na tnrP! and hi star.v—has-jtteaiit-.Jihe reintroductloj^-o^the i4ea 
of piiT-pnaa Contemporary purposeful patterns v/hich will include 
both the relative and the objective, the general and the parti­
cular within the framework of change and process are being sought. 
If such patterns can be found, they will answer our need for 
meaningful meaning. And it is to the search for such patterns 
that v/e must now turn. 
Thaja^are two nurraiit general approaches tn thp; pfr>hi cm r>,f 
meaning which are^ at best, in.cQmpl£ie«_a]Qii^iia^ie^tta^ Their 
inadequacy, however, does not mean that they have no contribution 
to make. ^ What cnntribufion they do make is largely in terms of 
helping us to understand . the^^oaxabliiklS^ VLn WhaT'saffi^ 
PfijonLa-ara^ookinfi for. Consequently, they do sKed some light on 
the nature of the current predicament. 
The-J^^ S;fe^of these incomplete approaches i^  to be found i n 
that new category of xvhi oh If; ]-i Rt.Pd the. Iipa^r.-Ir>f 
Some ox these books stress the need for and the 
methods of attaining harmonious adjustment and successful adap­
tation to the current scene. Both types urge a positivf^ appvriar'h 
toBut they are both inadenuate because thev conceive! of 
p-robl fir.1 naT'T-mTOi xr ^ either urging escape froETTihe worid^nto 
SOTie private v/orld of inner security or counseling adjustment to 
the v/orld as it is. The former judges the world as bad, the latter 
as good. And neither appears to understand the current demand for 
improving our v/orld. 
The of these inadequate approaches i r. f>xi f 
a v/ord meaning "to stand frki-^-h " a major strand of this movement 
is called tTencIi exi ptt.tqnti i pm since its most widely knov/n ex­
ponent is .fean-PaTTT^ It denies any dei^yf or 
reasons similar r>f Hoi har]i,man as v/lthout any aid 
'other thairTn:s~own in"'Wlln Existentialism viev/s the 
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contcr.ijjorary wor 1 d 
a.nY n-i-:3 i-i I 
s chai-acterized bv fluidity and viscosity. 
v/iiicii to Significantly, 
fir^ vaajcr~T/orlv was entitled Kausea. The e::iGtential-Sartro' 
i t world~Ts~not only unstable, it is also jjiOv/erruT. 
bi7"~Qcmipyjj5LgZ^ Qaer^ „ uial±ke-.-.'12aase wliicli 3artra»-_^ a a^ aeaber 
of the Frenclx,.,reiiiutance moveraent oppQsed -diixins 'l?orlcl. 'Yar 11^ 
I'e sees hir.iself conderaned to live his entii-e life in such a 
He is Text v/ith but two ciioices. eltIiex^ I£o acco73t anii 
"Secome a collaborator with the occuiyf'ing aowers. or to denounce 
ail.d,..denv S.]ULCk„aoW0rS^ . I£Jia--aakas..<?i thrj-r r.hnir.o i s dtpRl^ roved 
as an individual person. But, if he takes the second alternativ? 
'ttmre is in his deflailCi^  a moment of tragic triumph in which, 
before he is destroyed, he asserts the integrity and autonomy 
of the moral person. While this represents a counsel of despair 
it does serve to hi^^hlight the full spread of power in our ^  
culture today as it impinges on the individual. Its inadequacy 
can be An v;;-.at bn i-Rp;RTTtf^ fl..af; a nnntrarii r.t.ion  ^
Vflgj, 
hi£ 
"hlMi.aelf ..outT^ : .IT:, 
v/h-ilo uian responsible for getting Mi;.iseJjL.a>Jtto/^ j^  ^
lis predicament, at the same time denies his ability 
li QU lof it J ^ 
There are three other general appro^hes to the probleni 
meaning which are much raor^~c6nsistent and"complete. The 
of these demajids a return-JbD some of the absolutes of the pasjL. 
£^ llch_-as----tite~-eo«l-^  AugustiHe, the God of Aquinas^ , oi^ -illS—Gcui of 
Aristotle. All three are based on the demand for. an_,,a^ ^^  
wTfEZSSfaphy^ical^ajjd transcend^^ status as a source of meaning. 
"Tliere must be, so this argument runs, some priority which will be 
real, and not the fabrication of men's minds. Unless man stands 
for something, he will fall for anything. 
The earliest of these demands for a rehabilitated absolute 
was that which found expression in the +:bpi«-i-i r; existentlaliiaia 
of Soren_JCi^^;££3ift3^ (1813-1855) . This "Danish Socrates" initiated 
the whole line of existentialist thought, one strand of which v/e 
have just noted in Sartre. KierVegaard bpp-an with an attack op 
what he considered the main weaknesses of his ;t 
LXIfidlwK^ riQTyi^ Et,, ."t 
is of the individual in its dia-
le<r^ cal abstraciioiis ("You can' t, .give a hungry ; 
scientific obleetl^ l^te, which b#gan by_aeyering^ a^aanLs-jjiKn^ latexesis 
and meanings from his knowing and never could ,get.„_thera reunited 
againT^and tHe" established Danish jdutheran chursh.v/hieh_,h^^ charged 
identified Christianity with Christendom and the statixa—caio. After 
this incisive attack "on these aspects of his culture, Kierkeggard 
claimed that nineteenth century man had created an abstraction^ 
This he could use to jusTH lis whims and 
desires in a way identical v/ith the reference to the "peoples" 
v/hich we have already noted, for an e"f i 
nev/ set qf ^ ^yonlH pogn-i np;fni—tn nan as an existent 
iSiaT^ idual. "Hiese —to I'liiuu di f fnr'^nt wayri-of 
•gihg £Lt life: tiT?  ^, tlje—elhicaJ, njir1 tho' 
according to v/hich man viev/ed 1 i f^ 1" •r-r.-nmc A-f pi r.-acn-pr. ^ r^nty, anH 
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/QOCL Tliere v/as no easy or rational pi'ogresGion from one of these 
'^To^nother; it a raatter of deliberate choice at each stage, 
hence Kierkegaard's nickname of I?r. Either/Or. Ee regarded the 
l i f e  o  f ~ m a n  n  x  n  c o m p T  • - h a £ L . . , . r e  x n  ^  
whiciriie''noT^  only denouncea.but also renounces the wor 1 d, ^and^ 
TTitvYws himself on tUe mercy and grac©^ of-Goc*. God's forgiven^. "^ SHr^ S ^ ,^ <a od  x ivcness 
and S'j^ace Kicrl:o[iaard saw as sufficient to restore to man wnao 
he had lost, even as lie had done for Job, in a process v/hicix he 
called reduplication. As—a- -resvilt of t.]bLla^  KLcrkegaarcLyas nov/ 
able to lo.c^ , at-hiHS-^ werId through uer4r-„,-dl£ferent^ y^-es,,„ang;^ J^  
see it as somethinii. not to be exp^ited for his _p^leasure, but as 
a' gift~tQZbe~lIsed for the glory of 
The line of thought begun by Kierkegaard remained buried 
in Danish for a long time. Gradually his works \/ere translated^ 
into German, and then in the 1930's into English. Because of his 
penetrating criticisms, v/hich read as though they had been 
v/ritten in and for the twentieth century, his thought v/as picked 
up and used by some of the.,-mos,t.AnfluentiaOiit.e.s^ ^^ ^^  ^ : 
KSEIiiBaxHi tlSSS) in Germany, and ReinhoM...fiij2imhr (1CG2) and 
Richar&^elmim (1G94) in the United States. But even^those who ^ 
Have not been willing to accept his reinterpretation ox Augustine s 
God have been greatly influenced by his negative crxticisns^. ^iis 
analysis of Western man as creating the abstraction of the "publxc 
to relieve himself of his moral and religious responsibility, and 
his creation of myths such as progress to relieve himself of his 
i-esponsibility for decisive action, have been widely accepted. 
It is this clinension of his thought v/hich has influenced not only 
French existentialism, but also many poets ana dramatists. We will 
return to this influence in a later chapter. 
Almost imiiiediately after Kierkegaard but, as far as we know 
completely uninfluenced by him, there appeared another demand for 
a rehabilitated absolute, both like and yet unlike his. Thxs was 
'ae (II strident demand of the German, Friedrich NietaS 
crucial differenc.S-Ja£±g,gen these ^ 
two or sour.oe3- of cujrren.^ .„.,o-fc^ i^ s,tej..i 
l^e±ssjGii®-'-^ >--«oaxal.e:fce .denial—• "fTorl in Ciflao., 
-1900) . 
two _ «1 
-ijnilil tiare, however, also very important. 
various forms in which they 
lia±,-^aii,._needed something to 
experxencea 
.priority 
And b o t X . . u . S .£i 
iecatise of this that they are toua.7 
rotagonists of irrationalism. fT•^  r 
God, centered on v/hat ho saw 
ghtenment and liberalism on 
Lll over reason,. 
boge 
•p t a C-.-
r also as 
ITietsscHe's at c-, after the^"death" 
as the debilitating effects of the 
culture. The results of these li -- - ^ ^, . ivements were, in his eyes, a subversion ox values to Cue poxnt 
and c which nothing was more important than anything else, and all valves were determined by the majority. Liberalism, aemociacy, 
socialism in all their forms were, for him, but the means by whxch 
the masses had dragged aesthetic and moral values down from the 
heights to their own level, the level of sensory pleasure. Aa a 
result. Western cultui^e was completely lacking^n standards. 
- I 
p. 
But ITiGtsGclie ruled out any I'etvirn tc the o 
because >• al  xreodr-vi a;iiT 
indivicaial.  
an 
-&7 aJLLi£.£3 
There foi 'e r.ian m 
ofETstory] 
( and 
;tandar.di 
3 IG how he~Tnierpfeted 
-and values anew. Within 
a mass cultu.re, Guch an attenpt could not help i3u.t brin^J down oxi 
the head of the standard bearer an attacli by the proponentG of 
that cultui*e. 'Pn-.^  rpanon neither tl^  ^ y-i-f:" v/im 
nourican mirvont values nor wao axx -J." Lroa. novi 0jl£sea^__ssjcapi -oej -ifiCia n;./! bv i t .  
Eut, for Nietsscae, thiG tragedy was to be welconied rather than 
avoided, because i t  is only thus that such people can be suffi­
ciently tour;henod to be adequate for their task. Since this 
aliiiost dialectical approach was conpletely naturalistic, the 
pIiilosGiJhv of history which i t  iiu-jlied was that of a Grceh 
cyclical pattern of continual recurrence of the sane situation 
oygr and over a^:;ain. 
a J 
.•7 .7 IT 
of reason and his emphasis 
:orec. w^iai conclceroa 
ICiotzsche's orif^inal 
.r^-estive construction. Eut foilrjwei;r 
s  s;rame-
helpful analysis, 
l^ d 
i  ei^ipaasis ide£ the 
6arly Aryw'-^ri i-h^ 
BOTLOR: ,-w 4- .^c "^ 
ana maco nxs 
'WhiTe 'metssche'""h ac. seen the 
a.nri ^ iSTrrrT^  '.'.Pm^ guTar: a^ L-T-r!Yg 
lies, il;: waa-.:.:t]ae. Kazis- wha- denlc^ d 
tae intention of his t^^r.^^iTb^^ apr] turned i t  into a -iue •xxcacion 
sis into a xpr their own progrm. They turned his cultural analy: 
racial analysis, and warped his cultural valuea into nationalistic 
ones. Guch a perversion of Nietzsche Gur ;gests that any analysis 
of his thought must, in the first place, dissociate i t  fron recent 
manifestations and, in the second place, must ash whether hi: 
anaiysiS Ox oui-
used withovit siuilar recults,  
iiO 
The third of these denands for abscJoilxg—ija-jreDrcsonted_ pv 
•.Scuan Catholicisiu's current call for a return to thn 
ai _________ The n-5 t . i  a t ion of this movenicnt. s woii as oi 
:r.any other laoveraents "./ithin the contemporary Homan church, -"nr-^n 
froa one of the : roatfint -rr^r.P-nt. DODGG. Leo XIII (ICTS-ISO^') .  In 
his letter,  "Cn the Restoration of Christian Philosophy" (1073), 
vn vnr- Rr,:"an ±l3e 
aDtidntn ^CIT J. X v_» J, i.ii 
lie ca 11 o d -upoh "Sosaxi (Ja t  ho 1 i cc 
Kantlaalsn. science^, and liberalism. 
i'Cji.GGxl v/iGCiOLi Cx tTS "rsistore" tiie 
Thonas [and] extend and perfect the old by nev; truths." Universities 
were encouraged to concentrate on the study of Aquinas. The corpus 
of Thooistic writinii;s was translated into Eaclish by the Dominicans. 
the 
C a tJ^ i^IMlSSea 
outstanding thinkers who have been in"^ this 
, <j|_ac 
IZaritain (1C3C) , and Barbara Ward (IDld) .  All three were 
aT'f rg-pj?-£igr^n-;: r1-i v "nrent "iTttitudes 
;aues 
converts 
tovyard Catholicisia. Gllscn, 
nystical^ /iLV o: prii-iax-lly—tha—kixi.tcrian. is verY~^,procTi 
w i M a r i t a i x i ^ j i a s  been more the rationalist 
foiloY^g.r--ojb--T-ho»aaa.».,,,.,:fch^^ critic of CQixieiiporara: nea-Chriii^Aas. 
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political and social movement.a->--and the l3rilliant_expanettt^-^ 
whair~h^ calls Christian humanism, Barbara Wardn an English econo­
mist , has applied fhese latter "principles to history andjcur 
• world proBleins." 
The contemporary strength of neo-Thomism is to be found 
primarily in two of its aspectsTTI^^ it has offered some of 
the most trenchant criticisma.J3LL-.tIie _Policies oF'NaziGm, "fascism, 
a"® .CoinmunXsm; the" economics_of socialisnTa^ capTtMism^ aaHT™* 
the basic ideas "oI~T:T5eriXism and the EinTigSTenmenT^ It sees all 
prry f- de feat i ng and' destruet rve of the-J^e 
nature of man as interpreted by Aristotle and Aquinas, ^cor^ 
neo-Thomism has insisted that man is in need 
guxdeTSim^ and thailiMHEaut be found supremely in 
thfi Rnmalr chim^. It is, however, ^i,JHOolRC3EaLs5j2£.Z£2^r •=!tnnt anA.,Xi.3aQ.KaJr -»fainte-ey^  ^. while they may accept much of neo-
Thomism's analysis and criticism^ .fei^lk^ It is not only their 
refusal to accept such an authority that brings them to a halt, 
but it is also their belief that both Aristotelianism and Thomism 
are inadequate when dealing with the contemporary emphases on 
process and pluralism. 
It is just this combination of a need felt for authority 
with the refusal to accept it in any political or religious insti­
tution which has led to a call by some to return to Aristotle 
without Aquinas. This appealj however, bears no similarity to 
that of Simplicio in Galileo's Dialogues This npn-Ari stotelianism 
argues that liberalism results xn raeaninglessnoss5 and finally in 
an appeal to power. It insists that twentieth century science, 
which v/e will eicaraine more carefully in a later chapter, has drawn 
so heavily on the thought of Hume and Kant that all it can offer 
man is the knowledge of his experiences„ but no knowledge of that 
noumenal world v/hich alone makes those very experiences possible. 
Lacking this objective referent to the metaphysically real v/orld, 
li-> Wllhuut anv Qf-bn-n •f-ho'n 
pToases man. Conseq-UGnn^ tlie neo-ArTstotGlians argue, our con-
'^texaiJora.Ty ^Iturc lias degenerated into the production cf mere 
stimularxts. And, as aan has built mo his tni n'rarf-.n 
stinurAats. our arT" esocclaj 1 v hag bQConc Eoro and noro^istortcd, 
tiinatuxii'l^ .and abnormal -s n t.n bp n nT n fn >Trr^i'go' xno cane • 
"kick" or "charf^^l^ Tliis~"r^ults in V:ne""appearance of increasingly 
r.:onstrcus isroc-uctioao. 
The sauG thing, it is naintainedj ha.c happen©cl tc our ethical 
values and standards. Since all valuea are to be interpreted in 
terms of pleasure or happiness, there is no limit to v/hich they 
can be subverted. Tliis situation is all the racre disastrovis in 
IJoliticsv/here the denial of any real values results in theii-
being no limits put upon our exx^anding political institutions. 
Two important spokesmen for this neo-Aristotelianisn (sometimes 
i-eferred to as I'ealism in the older sense of that v/ord) are the 
Englishmen, C. E. M. Joad (1£D1|, and the American, Robert II. 
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liutchins (1C09) . It v/as Y/orld ?/ar II v/liicli turned Joad into a 
nee-Aristotelian. Ee conclvided that there must be some values if 
the contemi^orary world v/ere not to be destroyed. Hut chins arrived 
at siEiilar conclusions as a result of his experience v/ith American 
higher education. This he sav/ as dominated by three isms: scientism, 
presentism, and instrumentalism. It has been largely due to the 
influence of I-Iutchins and his adherents that the Great Books 
Foundation was started, and that its programs for the study of 
these books are being offered throughout the-United States today. 
One of the major criticisms of nee-Aristotelianism points to 
the fact that J, within a culture that calls itself Christian, it 
has in the past led to Roman Catholicism and could do so again, 
something which these critics want to avoid. A second criticiam 
points to the Aristotelian interpretation of man as deioendont on 
the state. This interpretation not only contradicts the liberal 
viewj, but also raises the possibility of the return of a political 
institution to implencnt such absolutist ideas. A third criticism 
asks whO' would interpret and implement Aristotelian ideals, 
assuming they v/ere accepted. This is the old question of v/ho 
would counsel the counselor. And it is perhaps this last criticism 
which is the most influential, 
A.,second major generalized attempt to ^ind meaning is conser-
vatism. It is not uninfluenced by the"~crl"ticTsms of those who would 
return to some form of absolutism. In most cases it agrees with 
them entirely, even with some of Nietzsche's criticisms. But here 
the similarity ends and the conservative, follov/ing lines already 
laid down by such thinkers as Burke, esche\7s the absolutes of 
religion and philosophy for the more malleable standards of history 
and tradition. The conservative criticizes the absolutes of both 
political right and left. He also insists on dealing with the 
particular and concrete, rather than the general and abstract, 
Th.a._COnser¥,a,ti^ e. ,phllosophy, of history can of 
ized by' ilL. 5mpiras.is on persistinr^ elements, rather tb^n nri _ 
tfrgTrc'-a-gci nro.^ reg-gr^  -i-iasxst-riTg'' on'^ tlie ccntiaul 
than its di'scontinuitj^"''TIS^''*'7esurFo this emphasis, the conser-
vative steers""alaean course between both optimism and pessimism, 
while at the same time strongly disclaiming any form of utopianism. 
Like Burke, he,.,..,sees, the ideas of v/hich he. .is .so critlcal as Jbhg 
result of the Enliahtenrae'nt^s oversimplificatiQn„of . >Jiikr-
 ^ti3e~J.ibex,ai... idea'.,,.Q.f,..aaiL-aawJ2JZ.sxly.,.-.Qa^  ^ . 
Priding himself on his realism, as he defines that word, the conser­
vative claims to take into account all of the relevant facts and 
factors before taking action. 
The constrnc.tl,s.a.„GQiii:x±bai±.lQn.x>j£.^ ..^ ajaaa3:,vatism is grounded in 
the interpretation of man as an individual who is morally/ free and 
g^sponsiblb'. BuL litiiiritir his "freedom nor his responsibility is 
viev/eS~as"~Self-sufficient or complete. He is free v/ithin an hist­
orical context, or tradition, one that is entailed, as Burke put 
it. Ee is responsible both to the past and the future. What is 
possible is therefore just as important as what ought to be; and 
\ 
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what nan cannot do ia just as relevant as what he can do. 
Th<e-conservative is also intovAr-.t.orl in fhn f-rinllffv fr»fi o-f 
power as well as the larger. Paralleling llbcralisn's or^rf'^ai 
concern for the smaller institutionsjfheesip the fanily, 
LuoIiSS'iSS"; aS3~^ «Iucatio'n as~'ns'cessary'"for the noral development of 
the individual, and as checks on the possibility of any single 
institution's developing into an all-encoiapassing totality. His 
pluralism thus a£)plies to institutions as v/ell as individuals, 
^^ yhen the v;ox''d "conservative" is used loosely today, it can 
cover a number^ of di?gofentljaoiimiE i i Z .  
and Fascism, are"~to^ alitarian. But, while conservatives raay 
insisl; on tlie need for a^hority, few would permit it to become 
absolute. Here the conservative Joins forces with the liberal, 
and rejects ^le, idQa,„jthat an;/ individual, party, class, or state 
ca^ achieve a complete and totar vif^w > 1'^"!^' ir.iPlesiient it. 
v/^ i]niout_,,dea,tr©yxi^  ^ . The main line of conservative 
thought is today repr'esented best in many v/ays by the thought, 
as well as the life, of Sir V/inston Churchill (1274). And much 
of its appeal is found in its insistence on values other than the 
purely economic. 
The critics of contgnporar-v—xionscrvatism point to the fa t^ 
t h a t  i t  h a s  u s u a l i y  b e e n  g r o u n d e d  u p o n  a  t r a g l r i g t g c r a c y  
gueir"aS'^ iigland'''sr But^ '¥t'~'"Iea¥t"''Tn'"tri^ ^^  x'orm aristocracy is a 
declining force in the V^ostern TTorld, The leaders of business, 
v/ho might play the role, have yet to show the necessary vision or 
standards. A second criticism concerns the possibility of reestab­
lishing the importance of the smaller institution in our time. 
T£L-carve _out islands of^ independQnca , 
V7hirch-is domi-natedr-4iy-. liug,e.,„.and-.-power,fu,l ...ins ti tut ions, is to swim 
against the tide. A third question concerns the status.dFTlie 
values of conservatism.- Time... and. cIiaa£:.Q have entered into our 
culture so radically that our current yalues tend to be..l£ipernaneiit 
EmdT'^ feTatrtvc--;"'"'" 
I III — 
A attem-gt to establish some meaning is a continuation 
of yet another of the major Western intellectual traditions. It 
is grounded in the thought of Kant and Llill as that line has been 
developed by \7illiam James (1G42-1S1C) in pragxiatism and John 
viev/s, — 
^xcmDlet'S j/orld-viow. ijui,,. in~l;:Lavo£i--c:>J itn 
pntaphvmIn this way it tries to take account cf the criticisms 
of Snlightcnmont thought as being too narrow. 
Inst rune n t all s;.i is stronr; in its criticise of all alinoliiten ..II. • . . . I I II I I I , ^ .. ... and xT^lirties. ai^ crngfuraii^ sr-vn a.l . VI T^K: owe as. 
tjT-dtmni;ir.n . tWl oY^biTnnn f? ili , 
so the instrt:i,:entalists argu;^.'' eith^ to ex-periennr- anvthiD-
rr f •f . -v O ^  
iiatiu^al. Gr to attain anv GV'-ocruati'.rr.l r:oal. Ultii-iatc and final 
trntnr]; capccially tiiGGC Oi tiio Aridoteiian variety, are sovercly 
criticized ac bein;^ inadequate for a \7orld doiuinatod by tine and 
evolution. Fii'cjt cauGec of the lIev;tonian type arc alco beyond 
eiipcricnce. Any pe 1 to Guciu ao3olu cei3 loo^^ed upon ao a 
"failure of nei-ve." Iiigtrunenta 1 ig::i viCiVG conGcrvatiG;.i aG a 
vain attenpt to turn the clod: bac':. iind ix Geea eKirrtoiitiaLlGm 
CS -l*ui.ccuratc'.7atatoaent.. oTT^ Ee" pgobaf«^ -oi.^ Q.ci.orii. nan. 
The conatructive side of ins±xuLii3ii-taliGm ia baGed on the 
Enli!;h telSient arc^•"*""t^EKa-t J. G 1 nce Gcience has alxeixSLlZjione GO 
nyTch to free man fi"o:'.i oiitworn ideaG anS lo TJV/C in our handSTThe 
techniqucG by ueans o£ v/hich to conti-Qj mir^natin-al finvlrons'^pT^t, 
TF STiouId be enlar:;:od to'iSalY-Illa^  ^ contemj3£o:,ar3;: :.ajacd.al..jma 
TemG aG v/ell. 3v-ca a uethod, develoxDcd to include scientific 
Gxperioentation and artistic creativity, is accepted as Gelf-
correctin:^-. otartinr; from the Enlightenment idea of individual 
man as basically good and ignorance as Lis only source of evil, 
and calling on the moral drive and activistic approach of Kant, 
the instrumentalist approaches our contemporary problems as 
baGically external rather than internal. InGiGting on a Gcient-
ific objectivity v/ith regard to social problems, this approach 
rejects the subjectivist tendency of romanticists and existent­
ialists. Within this framev/ork, ideas are Geen aG instruments 
to aid nan in improving his condition rather than as abstract 
absoluteG. Ideas are thus primarily v/hat they were for Eenthan; 
tools for the reform of society. 
Thought \7ithin this instrumentalist trMltl.QJl.Jlfis.,,bcen v^ ork-
ing in—two' ria j or clirej^jXons^JTl^'scre The 
strltmtTxtc'islSasod self-sufficient nature 
as it is known by experience; any unexperienced nature, as v/ell 
as anything ti-anscendent, is ruled ovit by definition. This means 
that man, as an integral part of nature conceived in this v/ay, 
is capable of having ideas which are not separate from nature-as-
experienced. 3u.ch an interpretation presents a picture of nature 
as dynamic and evolutionary, one for v/hich Aristotelian universals 
and ITev/tonian laws are no longer adequate. This also means that 
_any . deductive__^orA,,pxior 1 iQ ic nethods are ruled out. 
To a nature'which is itself experimental, only' arf'lJxperlnenTal 
method can bo applied. Go the ideas which are developed in this 
context are of the status of hyxootheses v/hich, experimentally 
employed, are a source of valid knov/ledge. Guch knov/ledge, never 
final or absolute, iG the only kind of knov/ledge. 
The cultural direction of inatrumentalism .mr; nlipn^nd r.nnr.irl-
erably fror:i~ rne cnyn v/licih Wllir±t«!r-ifer.iOG tTTecTTb pi^ve the worth 
of moral values in terms of their™"cash value." J'ohn uev/ey took 
all such valvies to be instruments for improving the human situation. 
Ideas thus have the ideal component, and are capable of making 
room within human experience for aesthetic and religious, as well 
as ethical, values and meanings. Guch an interpretation of ideas 
has the advantage of keeping society open for further advances, 
ac \7cll as keeping it basically pluralistic. Pluralism in this 
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context emphasizes the basic importance of the individual, and 
instrumentalism's unv/illingness to allow any person to be but a 
means to the end of some institution. 
One aspect of instrumentalism_caIljS-Jor speci^|_jneiition at 
thlH pointl its,„.£iwhasis---aB- ediioati©n. In this, it is once again^ 
in line_\vitJa.l.lb^^ belief that education is _ the. best 
^Eo acEi^ye democjcatjijs .goals by democratic-Bieans. As we shall see 
major change _ culture^ which ,caiag..-ivAth the introduc^on 
tyf^'^'progressive education." 
Instrumentalism has been under attack from many different 
angles, the most publicized being directed at its educational 
policy. A<=!king the question: "Why can't Johnny.. 
people have been arguing for the refurn to^a more^^^d^ciplinejd 
tl^ e~oire^ 1latio^  ^ Abs6TutTs'f¥"o^  ^ stripes have criticized 
xnitrumentaiiim^^ lack of final values which, they argue, destroys 
any meaning its values may have. Some scientists and philosophers 
have argued against using logical and mathematical categories as 
mere problem-solving instruments, insisting on their objectivity 
or necessity. The Declaration of Independence was either signed 
in 1776 or it was not, and no amount of discussion about the status 
of mathematical concepts can change that fact, or the fact that 
the event followed the Boston Tea Party and preceded the signing 
of the Constitution. . Existentiali^ well as others Imv^ 
insisted that the ohiectTvitv in which TEsfni^  prides 
i'tseU cannot be"~a]^ le^ aital±he social areas in Jbhe same.w.a^L-ltot 
it- can be ajDj)lied^.to. .the_no^^^ Others have insisted that the 
philosopher's job i^ try to understand the world, rather than 
change it, and that understanding which is conceived primarily as 
an instrument of change and reform cannot give an accurate picture 
of the world as it is. Some political thinkers have suggested 
that instrumentalism can be infected v/ith power as well as other 
philosophies. They argue that its dependence on public validation 
leaves open the possibility that those in power may be able to 
determine the results of its experiments. For reasons such as 
these the question is being raised whether instrumentalism has 
achieved a self-correcting method any more than the older meta­
physics achieved a self-correcting world-viev/. Nevertheless, 
i^strjjmfirLtalisai^ is -stilt-the-most„inj£luen.tial--alijLlosophy in the 
Fni tpeople who might not even recognize it 
by name are using it, in,..pa.xt .p guide to their 
In addition to the specific criticisms already mentioned, the 
three general approaches to the problem of meaning v/hich we have 
discussed have been subjected to criticism equally general. One 
of these criticisms points to the fact that, JjL-fiyder to attain 
signif ic^ t_jLe,«.&lA..x^  P£ 6^ p^G^  j-gnj:c_^ re 
1 oft niiK'C^onvejsel-^^ any broarl o-pneral it1  nns fp rid, to become 
such abstractions that they are ..Q.£^ _Qal:£...JJjiiited appliisaMlaAju To 
"arrive"at €He^ generalizations it is necessary to become less and 
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less critical, and to override the finer distinctions which are 
meaningful in the intricate problems of both scientific and per­
sonal experience. Another ri-itlrism suggests that generalities 
and generalizations of anj^ type can become the means of forcing 
'Individuals into s6rt"^p"aTterns"of~tliou.?^^ ^p.tinn. While both 
of these criticisms nee^ to De s"p¥cified in detail if they are to 
avoid the charge of generalizing that there can be no generalizations, 
they do express an underlying uneasiness wMch most Westernmen 
feel when confronted by SUGK inclusive ideas.. This uneasiness 
ai-str-makes' common, that tfiiere~Ts~Tgaay go 
mucTT^ t'o Know that no one man can grasp it alT','"°mucli'Tress be an "/i" , Iiimii rrnn-ii-riT-'irt i, 'i , > i iiT i n i, Tj, aetitorrt^  suf f icxeijJ, the_ja&$ivx . And 
because of this Western man is more apt to feel at home working 
within specialized areas. 
The number of specialized areas of •S±"Hy g^^ <=; grown during 
rjecen1rir^ naTsj50E3ai2Z^ SjSS3i^ IaZiIsJ^  
irTEelTigTBTe^  order is a sta^ ering tas^  Listing is all the more 
tetXlcult because s5"liaiBry' df^ilTe cbn^^^ specializations 
represent attempts to bridge disciplines hitherto thought of as 
separate. Thus we have today such new areas as biochemistry. 
astrophysics, and cultural anthropology. There is also an 
increased empliasis nn t.bk.,J:^ ^^ >xe±i-iiaX-.^ peiCts- of manv of these 
new disciplines, such ^ s theoretical physics. In philosophical 
studies this trend can be seen in the reintroduction of the old 
Aristotelian prefix "meta," resulting in such studies as metalogic 
and metaethics. We have chosen but five of these f=;pppi h1 i 
areas for further study in the remalping chapters of this hook. 
The areas which have been chosen reprnsiont Rome of tho—mof^t 
significant growing edgea..-oj£~-Qur^-^v.llization today. It is impos-
^TMe~^6 do "more than suggest what is going"oh in these five areas. 
But they will indicate some of the more important directions in 
which contemporary thought is moving. Bv sampling what jis-^ oing 
on in these areas we can get an indication atleast of where men 
are looking^ whajt they are looking for, and what they find exciting. 
As we ^examine these specialized areas it will become clear 
that even they--JixeI5M711'£5jO-U^^ TKeTF'wrdei^TmjTicaTi*ons~in" terms 
of_ bo tJi... thought - and appl i cation,. >f^js^jacT" i s no'F"just a coincide nee 
or the result of contemporary man's need for more generalised 
theories. It is also a result of the modern empirical me'thods of 
contemporary^tiiinkers. Having established the adequacy or applica­
bility of some idea in a restricted area, such as mythmaking in a 
primitive society, the student then experiments with this idea in 
•other areas as well. Does it apply to other primitive societies? 
Does it also apply to more civilized societies? The very thrust 
of inquiry today, without any -of the older_.limiiLg^ carries it 
across the boundaries of its immediate concern, and out into un-
charted areas...aa-well. It is mainly because of this inquiring 
drive that most contemporary studies evidence not only the special­
ized and more generalized interests, but a continual alternation 
between both. And it is well that this is so because, without 
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i qJ -i T'-nA-i7i n^ the generaliats could easily become abstract 
j:o the point of nonreleVance, and \7ijgH5iii— 
GToeciarisi^^ e_aQilj_becpj3sI3AQratssi^,J7i.i^ 
A. GGcond obsorvatinn mav be. apposite. Idaas of great thinkexa. 
have often been iraposed by their diaciiil£i3u-JDLr-,bv raen of later 
X3eriocIs orr''oi'Eers. Perliaps at this very point we may be able to 
locate "arilirri^ue'^challenge to contemporary Western culture: jtp. 
£i-nd._guch ideas as v/ill .i^aLue—our probleriia..~~Jvlthn.iLt making them 
instrimeirg^lollloppr^^ion to_our,„fe 11 QV/nen, Herein may be found 
not only the contemporary claallenge, but also the contemporary 
oppoi'tunity. 
0f al 1 the places in v^hir.h to prepare to aQe.t-~auuiii. a chall­
enge J there is none bgJit^ jr (v/^ e jiight be indul£:sii-^ or..hoping) t 
a college". ~nGxs~v^ ier.e-Jtliex^ axeI_i:jnj^  ^
development and "maturity, interostecl,.iii.,.a-»52aa?i-®^--a:£.-.spiacijS^^ 
tions''f"""tfiei-o Ts""a \mxSgS.-.p;aPortunl.tx..J;,o c:yPlQ.ra-...,sma.J3ar,.t,icular>.. 
areas and^ atTthe sane time, discover thol£, 
Such a"coi:miunity"makes p*ossible illo cross-fertilisation of ideas 
as in almost no other type of instituion or comiaunity. Here the 
student has the opportunity to take his mind on training flights 
in all sorts of discussions. Here, in class and in dormitory 
sessions^ he is_-able_to develop the abi"lit3z_t£L,F.tajid nn his 
mental feet*, sharpen his wits in„J;he^^g argument» 
develop"TIie ability to" stick to the...argwa®3aj;;-, locate the weak 
pointg^in the opponent's line of thought, and search for new and 
bnttgr wayr, of solving problems both old and new. Having developed 
such an abiTi ty"Westefn man may be ""better equipped to produce a 
solution that will not have to be imposed on his fellows. 
